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For the nearly fourteen years from the time of his entry on the Haitian national political scene with his victory in the presidential election of December 1990 until his overthrow in February 2004, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was the dominant figure in Haiti's struggle to develop a meaningful democratic system. A polarizing figure from the start (a saviour to the poor and an anathema to the elite), his political career was marked by both personal controversy and a number of high-profile events: in addition to his decisive 1990 electoral victory, the most notable being the military coup that deposed him in 1991 and the U.S.-led military intervention that restored him to power in 1994 (Soderlund, 2006).

This study examines U.S. television network news coverage of what is, to this point at least, the last chapter in Jean-Bertrand Aristide's political career in Haiti: the domestic insurgency and international maneuvering that led to his resignation from the presidency and departure from Haiti to exile in Africa on February 29, 2004.[1] Prime-time television news coverage of events leading to the overthrow of President Aristide on ABC's "World News Tonight", CBS's "Evening News", and NBC's "Nightly News" comprise the database for the study. Using video tapes of 53 news stories provided by the Vanderbilt University Televison News Archive, U.S. network television news coverage of the final weeks of Mr. Aristide's presidency is examined on the following dimensions of story importance: number and date of news stories and their placement in newscasts, as well as the time allotted to them. Coded as well were the sources used in compiling the stories and the "frames" employed to explain to American audiences what was happening in Haiti and how this might affect the United States. We also speculate on how media coverage would likely influence U.S. public perceptions of the political situation in Haiti in term of exerting pressure for continued aid to the new Haitian government. In addition, descriptive language used with

respect to (1) President Aristide; (2) the rebel forces in Haiti seeking to overthrow him; (3) Haiti, as a country; and (4) the policies pursued by the U.S. government and U.S. President George W. Bush was recorded, coded, and analyzed to ascertain likely audience effects. Evaluated as well is the likely impact of visual material included in stories dealing with Haiti on U.S. audience interpretations of events occurring there.[2]

Since the end of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, the United States has played an influential, if not a decisive, role in Haitian politics. And, as Robert Entman has pointed out, "[t]he public's actual opinions arise from framed information, from selected highlights of events, issues, and problems, rather than from direct contact with the realities of foreign affairs" (2004, p. 123). While U.S. foreign policy cannot be said to be public opinion-driven, this important event in Haitian politics, which resulted in the country falling into the status of a truly "collapsed state" (Zartman, 1995; also see Mazrui, 1995), cannot but reignite the issue of the efficacy of continued U.S. aid to Haiti in public policy debate. In the context of Haiti's quest for political stability combined with honest and democratic government, how the 2004 rebellion and the overthrow of the Haitian president it provoked was portrayed in U.S. media might prove to be a significant variable in how quickly and generously the U.S. government responds to Haiti's needs following René Préval's victory in the February 2006 elections (see Orenstein, 1995).

History

The event in the history of U.S. involvement in the affairs of Haiti that set in motion the events of February 2004 can be fixed fairly precisely (February 7, 1986), with the "assist" given by the Reagan administration in the removal of dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier. United States interest in Haiti goes back a long way, at least to its struggle for independence from France during the first years of the 19th century. Haitian independence emerged in 1804 after thirteen years of slave revolt; in 1806, fears of a similar slave rebellion in the Southern states, coupled with a *rapprochement* with France, turned an initially supportive U.S. policy toward Haitian independence into a trade embargo that "began a century of commercial ostracism," leading to Haitian isolation from the world economic system; the United States only extended diplomatic recognition to the Haitian government during its own Civil War in the 1860s (Abbott, 1988; Farmer, 2004).

The 20th century would bring a dramatic increase in U.S. involvement in Haitian affairs. Few, however, would argue that the overall results of this attention were beneficial to Haiti. During the same period that Europe was colonizing Africa (see Hochschild, 1998), the United States also

came of age as a world power. And it was, not surprisingly, an area close to home—the Caribbean Basin—that captured the attention of American imperial thinkers. Further, within the Caribbean, Haiti's strategic position in relation to the Atlantic approaches to a possible inter-oceanic canal, its acute political instability, combined with foreign (particularly German) interest in acquiring a coaling station on the island, led in 1915 to a U.S. military intervention and occupation of the country that lasted formally until 1934 (Plummer, 1988), with full financial autonomy not restored to Haiti until 1952 (Abbott, 1988).

While it is impossible here to deal in any sustained way with the American occupation of Haiti and the years that followed, a summary judgment is that whatever benefits attributed to the occupation in areas of creating economic infrastructure and improving health were at least offset by the importation of American-style racism and a refusal on the part of the Americans to give any substantive meaning to the concept of democracy. The result was that the occupation served to strengthen the position of the Haitian elite in relation to the mass of black Haitians (Bellegarde-Smith, 2004; also see Nicholls, 1996; Schmidt, 1971; Millspaugh,1931), a social, economic and political divide that continues to bedevil the country to this day (see Dupuy, 2004). Another legacy of dubious value stemming from the American intervention was the creation of the Haitian army (organized by the Marine Corps as a constabulary force), which quickly took up an unintended role in Haitian politics (McCrocklin, 1956). As evidenced by the February 2004 insurgency, that role—protector of the interests of the Haitian elite—appears to have persisted even after the abolishment of the Army by President Aristide following his 1994 restoration to power.

It would be unfair to lay blame for the Duvalier dictatorship, which began in 1957, at the feet of the United States; however, American policy certainly set the stage for it, and, there is no question that the U.S. supported the Duvaliers at various times during the course of the Cold War (Danner, 1993, Nov. 4). The nearly thirty years of Duvalier family rule, characterized by extraordinary greed combined with brutal political repression carried out by the feared *tontons macoutes*, proved catastrophic for Haiti (Fauriol, 1988; Wilentz, 1989). The dictatorship led to some of the most talented members of Haitian society (the mulatto elite) being forced into exile and to the neutering of the political power of the Army; as well, significant wealth was transferred out of the country (Maingot, 1986-87). The result was that in 1986, when Haiti was finally rid of the Duvaliers, the country was gripped by poverty, illness, and misery, with a huge gap existing between the few who were very rich and the vast majority who were very poor (Hector, 1988).

In short, while the United States carries considerable colonial and quasi-colonial baggage throughout the Caribbean Basin, especially in the case of Haiti, the history of the twenty-year colonial occupation created considerable difficulties for any direct U.S. involvement in the affairs of the country. Yet circumstances in Haiti did lead to two further U.S. military interventions: a major one in 1994 to restore the deposed Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the presidency and a more limited one in 2004, undertaken only after Mr. Aristide had been forced to leave the country after being denied support by both the United States and France.

Background to the 2004 Overthrow of Aristide

One would have hoped that Aristide's second five-year presidential term that began in 2001 would have served to consolidate the modest democratic gains that had been made in Haiti over the preceding decade. Not only did this not happen, it exacerbated political divisions in ways that would imperil the fragile democratic practices that were struggling to survive. The situation had deteriorated to where, in early 2004, armed gangs controlled over half the country and were poised to attack the capital. At this point, the United States and France reiterated their refusal to intervene in the crisis until Aristide resigned from the presidency. With no support for Aristide forthcoming from the international community, a decentralized insurgency, with a total force estimated as somewhere between 250 and 1000, ultimately succeeded in forcing the president to leave the country on the last day of February, 2004. For Haiti, the result of the events of February 2004 was what Robert Pastor has called "an absolutely failed state: no institutions, no rule of law, no spirit of compromise, no security" (as quoted in Polgreen and Weiner, 2004, Mar. 3, p. A6).

The crisis that triggered the end of Aristide's presidency came to a boil in early February 2004. However, it did not develop without warning, as Aristide's anti-democratic tendencies had been evident early in his second term (Rotberg, 2003). Writing in October 2003, Alexandre Trudeau described Haiti as "back-sliding," with Aristide's "grip of power" becoming "more authoritarian."

> Opposition radio stations have been firebombed by Aristide partisans. A corrupt police force has been involved in mounting human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrests and summary executions. For the hundreds of thousands who lined the streets of Port-au-Prince on October 15, 1994, to greet Aristide on his return, the promise of democracy and a break with the country's violent past has vanished. (Trudeau, 2003, Oct. 27, pp. 31-32)

By mid-December 2003, there were reports of wide-spread rioting directed against Aristide, led by university students who were calling for his resignation. In the street battles, President Aristide was supported by the so-called *chimêres* (or "monsters"), thugs mostly recruited from the slums. On the other side, the student cause was supported by a self-described "Cannibal Army" screaming "for revenge against Aristide" (Warren, 2003, Dec. 13, p. A14). This group had been led, until his murder in September 2003, by Amiot Métayer, a long-time supporter of Aristide. Métayer's brother Butteur accused Aristide of sanctioning the murder (Trujillo, 2004, Feb. 7, p. A14). Significantly, Haiti's police force was reported as ineffective in controlling the growing violence.

Conditions in Haiti continued to deteriorate. In early January 2004, Peter Goodspeed reported that "the Caribbean's first independent state… is threatening to collapse in a whirlpool of despair brought on by decades of poverty, violence, political instability and environmental degradation." He went on to argue that "[t]he only glimmer of hope… was a proposal by Haiti's Roman Catholic Bishops Conference to replace the disputed Congress [that had been elected in May of 2000] with a transitional nine-member council, headed by a Supreme Court justice," as well as representatives of major political parties and civil society groups (Goodspeed, 2004, Jan. 10, p. A13). U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell reportedly supported the plan, as did President Aristide. Opposition political forces, however, also demanded the resignation of Aristide, a position they continued to hold throughout the on-going February political negotiations to end the crisis.[3]

At the end of the first week of February it was reported that the "Cannibal Army," the previously pro-Aristide paramilitary group, had taken over Gonaïves, Haiti's fourth largest city, capturing the police station and burning the mayor's house in what was described as "one of the bloodiest confrontations in escalating tensions between the government of the poorest country in the Americas and its opponents" (Trujillo, 2004, Feb. 7, p. A14). About a week following the start of the uprising, with the death toll climbing to nearly fifty, there were reports of Aristide's supporters mounting a counter offensive in Gonaïves. Large portions of the northern part of the country, however, remained outside of the government's control.

In mid-February, with the police force in disarray and with no Haitian army to defend his government, President Aristide called upon the international community for assistance to put down the insurgency. While the United States did send more Marines to Haiti to guard its Embassy, it refused to send troops to stop the fighting, holding out instead for what was called a "political solution" to Haiti's problems (Stevenson, 2004,

Feb. 18). With most of the north of the country, including Cap-Haïtien, under the control of rebel groups, whose main spokesperson was the just returned Guy Philippe (McParland, 2004, Feb. 17), Aristide's political opponents continued to press for the president's resignation, in addition to the reforms contained in the internationally brokered compromise to end the crisis (Warren, 2004, Feb. 23). When rebel groups, led by an amalgam of former Aristide supporters, ex-military, and paramilitary personnel of various stripes, were ready to attack Port-au-Prince, the Bush administration continued to play hardball with Aristide, offering him protection only if he left the country and did so immediately. Following a night of negotiations with U.S. officials, Aristide departed Haiti on a U.S.-chartered aircraft early in the morning of February 29, 2004, bound for the Central African Republic (Polgreen and Weiner, 2004, Mar. 1). It was only after he had left the country that the United States, France, and Canada sent troops to Haiti in an attempt to restore order in a country, where, over the preceding three weeks, order had been allowed to vanish (Marquis, 2004, Mar. 1; Wucker, 2004).

Media Coverage

Major U.S. television networks began covering the Haitian insurgency on February 7, at a time when the violence that had been on-going for at least a month was clearly visible on their radar screens. Their coverage began mainly with 20 to 30 second brief summaries of daily developments delivered by news anchors. As measured by both the number of stories and the time devoted to them, coverage of the crisis continued to increase, peaking in the days surrounding Mr. Aristide's departure. By March 3, when the Haitian President had arrived in the Central African Republic charging that the U.S. had kidnaped him and forced him into exile at the point of a gun, the insurgency leading to the president's ouster had been reported on U.S. network news in a total of 53 stories, containing 67 distinct news segments.[4]

Table 1 offers an overview of the major characteristics of this coverage and shows that the Haitian crisis was considered to be a serious story by U.S. television news: roughly a quarter (26%) of stories led off newscasts, while nearly half (47%) were run in the first three high-impact positions. Other key indicators likewise point to the importance of the Haitian rebellion in the news pecking order: nearly a quarter of stories ran for 3 minutes or over, with five in the 5 to 8 minute range. That another quarter of stories ran for 30 seconds or less means about half the stories aired ranged from a respectable one to three minutes in length. The Anchor/Reporter format was used in nearly 70% of stories, while 17% featured two or more news

	Number	Percentage
Lead Stories	14	26.4%
Run in First Three Positions	25	47.2
30 Seconds and under	14	26.4
3 Minutes and over	13	24.5
Run between February 7-13	5	9.4
Run between February 14-20	15	28.3
Run between February 21-27	20	37.7
Run between February 28-March 3	13	24.5
Anchor only	16	30.2
Anchor/Reporter	37	69.9
With a Reporter in Haiti	26	49.1
Using Experts	12	22.6
With two or more news segments	9	17.0
Including Visuals	51	96.2
Video of Aristide	34	64.2
Video of Philippe	14	26.4
Video of Chamblain	8	15.1
Video of Bush	2	3.8
Video of Powell	7	13.2

TABLE 1: Story Characteristics (n=53)

segments. Almost half of the stories (49%) included a reporter on the ground in Haiti, while 23% used experts to add background, analysis, and perspective to events as they unfolded.[5]

Visual material formed an important part of coverage, with at least some video present in all but two stories. Jean-Bertrand Aristide dominated the visual coverage of personalities, appearing in nearly two-thirds of stories; some of this visual material includes file-footage dating from his restoration to power in 1994. Aristide's major rebel opponents, Guy Philippe and Louis-Jodel Chamblain, appeared in 26% and 15% of stories respectively. Major U.S. political figures maintained a decidedly low media profile in media reporting: President Bush appeared in two stories, both aired just after Mr. Aristide had left Haiti for Africa. Colin Powell was the major U.S. figure to appear in newscasts, visible in 13% of stories, with one appearance dating from the 1994 intervention to restore Aristide to the presidency.

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	Total
Jean-Bertrand Aristide	16	3	2	2	/	23
Haitian Government	1	1	1	/	1	4
Political Opponents	1	3	/	/	1	5
Andy Apaid	1	2	1	/	/	4
Rebels	1	3	2	/	/	6
Guy Philippe	6	/	8	3	/	17
Haitians in the street	6	10	2	8	2	28
Prominent Haitians	/	3	2	/	/	5
Americans in Haiti	2	3	1	1	/	7
George W. Bush	5	1	/	/	/	6
White House	5	1	/	/	/	6
Colin Powell	2	5	/	2	1	10
State Department	9	/	2	1	/	12
Donald Rumsfeld	/	/	/	1	1	2
Pentagon	/	1	3	/	/	4
U.S. Cong. Republican	/	/	1	/	/	1
U.S. Cong. Democrat	/	2	1	/	/	3
Black Caucus	1	3	5	/	/	9
U.S. Experts	1	6	6	6	1	20
United Nations	1	1	/	1	/	3
Other World Sources	1	1	1	1	1	5

TABLE 2: Number of Times Sources Used (n=67 "News Segments")

Table 2 shows the actual number of times sources were used (on and off camera) in constructing news stories. In that up to five sources could be coded for each news segment of a story, the table could accommodate up to five sources, for sixty-seven news segments, in the order they were used in news stories.

It is evident that primary sources consulted by reporters in their coverage of the Haitian crisis comprised a very select group: Jean-Bertrand Aristide led off with sixteen appearances, followed by the U.S. State Department with nine. Guy Philippe and Haitians-in-the-street were each used as lead sources six times, while George Bush and the White House were each used five times. When we examine all sources used, the range of information

	Primary N / %	Secondary N / %	Tertiary N / %	Total N / %
Pol/Soc Violence	32/ 60.3	6/ 11.3	1/ 1.9	9/ 73.6
U.S. Involvement	5/ 9.4	18/ 34.0	9/ 17	32/ 60.4
Implications of Refugee Crisis	1/ 1.9	5/ 9.4	6/ 11.3	12/ 22.6
Implications of Rebel Backgrounds and Policies	2/ 3.8	3/ 11.3	4/ 7.5	9/ 17.0
Aristide's Policies and Failure of Democracy	1/ 1.9	4/ 7.5	2/ 3.8	7/ 13.2
Request for International Intervention	1/ 1.9	0	6/ 7.5	7/ 13.2
Implications of Aristide's Departure	4/ 7.5	2/ 3.8	0	6/ 11.3
Negotiations to End Crisis	3/ 5.7	3/ 11.3	0	6/ 11.3
Development of a Humanitarian Crisis	1/ 1.9	1/ 1.9	2/ 3.8	4/ 7.5
Drug Trafficking	0	0	1/ 1.9	1/ 1.9

TABLE 3: Percentage of Stories Containing Media Frames (N=53)

providers broadens considerably: Haitians-in-the-street occupied pride of place, used twenty-eight times (mainly in short sound bites contained in visuals), followed by the Haitian President, who appeared on camera or was cited a total of twenty-three times. In order, beginning with the third most frequently used source, the remaining sources of news were: American experts (20 times), Guy Philippe (17 times), the U.S. State Department (12

times), the Congressional Black Caucus (9 times), Americans in Haiti and Haitians in the United States (7 times each). President Bush, the White House, and Andy Apaid (a political opponent of President Aristide and one of the leaders of the Group of 184) were each used 6 times. Sources other than Haitian or American were nearly invisible in coverage: world leaders served as sources of information a total of five times, while United Nations representatives provided information three times.

Data in Table 3 addresses the important issue of framing. Framing has been defined by William Gamson as "the central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue" (1989, p. 157) and by Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Paul Waldman as "the structures underlying the depictions that the public reads, hears and watches" (2003, p. xii). As explained by Tod Gitlin, framing is used by journalists to "process large amounts of information quickly and routinely: to recognize it as information, to assign it to cognitive categories, and to package it for efficient relay to their audiences" (1980, 7). What is important in framing is media's ability to shape an audience's understanding of the world around them, i.e., "What is the story all about?" and "What are the implications for the United States?"

Ten frames were identified as attempting to explain to American audiences what was happening in Haiti during the February 2004 insurrection. Of these, both as primary and total frames, two dominated coverage: political-social violence and U.S. involvement in Haiti. Violence appeared a frame in 74% of stories and as the primary frame in 60%. U.S. involvement trailed significantly in use as a primary frame, appearing in only 9% of stories. However, in overall framing it emerged as quite significant, appearing as a frame in a total of 60% of stories. U.S. involvement included not only the possibility of an intervention in the current crisis, but also the failure of the 1994 U.S. intervention to secure its objectives.

At various points in the evolution of the crisis, other frames came into play. As primary frames, these included the implications of President Aristide's departure, the on-going political negotiations aimed at ending the crisis, and the implications of the unsavoury backgrounds of the rebel leadership on the future of Haitian democracy. In addition to the above, in terms of total frames used, we find a significant focus on a possible flood of refugees to the United States, which appeared in 23% of stories,[6] the possibility of an international peacekeeping force being sent to Haiti, and President Aristide's policies as contributing to the failure of democracy in Haiti, each appearing in 13% of stories. The possible development of a humanitarian crisis in Haiti and the use of the country as a transfer point

	Number	Percentage*
Shooting, Burning, or Looting	30	58.9
Dead Bodies	14	27.4
Refugees in Boats	13	25.4
1994 U.S. Intervention	5	9.4

*In that videos of multiple scenes appeared in the same story, there is considerable multi-coding; therefore, percentages cannot be summed.

TABLE 4: Percentage of Stories with Emotional Impact Videos (n=53)

in the international shipment of illicit drugs, rounded out the frames used in assessing the implications of the crisis for the United States.

Visual components of stories must also be considered in understanding the process of crisis framing discussed above. As was pointed out, visuals formed an important part of coverage, as all but two stories (96.2%) contained some video material. Table 4 shows the four dimensions of visual content that were identified as especially significant in contributing to American audience interpretations of events in Haiti: videos of shooting, burning, or looting; of dead bodies; of refugees in boats; and scenes of the 1994 U.S. intervention.

The first two of these relate to the dominant frame of political-social violence and can be seen as "triggers of fear" with respect to the domestic situation in Haiti. Scenes of shooting, burning, or looting appeared in well over half of the stories, while dead bodies appeared in just over one-quarter.[7] Along with the extraordinary amount of negative language used to describe Haiti (to be discussed below), these visual portrayals conveyed both a sense of danger and futility with respect to further United States involvement in the country. Scenes of refugees in boats and the 1994 U.S. intervention both served to underscore the links of the crisis to the United States, but they did so in different ways. Scenes of refugees in boats, much of which was file-footage from 1994, appeared in a quarter of stories, while scenes from the 1994 intervention were shown in almost 10%. Clearly, the former tended to dramatize a possible negative consequence of Haitian violence for the United States (raising fears of an impending new rush of immigrants), while the latter underscored the failure of the U.S. efforts at implanting democracy ten years previously, this despite what might have been seen as a significant military and financial commitment on the part of the United States.

	Postive	**Negative**	**Total**
Jean-Bertrand Aristide	36%	64%	125/100%
Rebel Groups	29%	71%	65/100%
Haiti	2%	98%	94/100%
Gorge W. Bush/U.S. Policy	31.5%	68.5%	54/100%

TABLE 5: Percentage of Descriptors Reflecting Positively and Negatively on Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Rebel Groups that Opposed Him, Haiti, and George W. Bush/U.S. Policy (Neutral and Ambiguous descriptors omitted)

Data in Table 5 establish that with respect to the major participants in the February 2004 crisis that resulted in the overthrow of President Aristide, there was no side on which the angels congregated. All major participants involved received negative portrayals: President Aristide, 64% negative vs. 36% positive; the rebels that sought to oust him, 71% negative vs. 29% positive; Haiti, the country which they struggled to control, 98% negative vs. 2% positive; and the U.S. president and his administration, that, try as it might, could not help but become involved in one way or another in the crisis, 68.5% negative vs. 31.5% negative positive. One thing that can be said without dispute is that the crisis was not presented to the American people as a confrontation between "good and evil" in which the United States aligned itself with the "forces of light" against the "forces of darkness." Following the end of the Cold War, media interpretation of events had become far more nuanced, as is evidenced by their treatment of this crisis, as well as others occurring in the circum-Caribbean (see Soderlund, 2001; 2003).

Of all the recipients of evaluative language, by far, Haiti fared the worst (98% negative), while President Aristide emerged as what can only be described as the "best of a bad lot," with just under two-thirds of his valenced descriptors coded negative. The United States and the rebel forces fell somewhere in between, with the United States receiving only a somewhat less scathing linguistic bashing (68.5% negative) than did the rebels (71% negative).

Let us begin the analysis of linguistic portrayal with President Aristide, who was the focus of the most evaluative commentary (see Appendix A). His electoral victory in 1990 and his early popularity were appropriately noted. As well, there were popular proclamations of support for him voiced by Haitians on the street. Beyond that, the Haitian President was portrayed as open to, and in fact agreeing to, a reform package to end the rebellion and finally resigning the presidency to spare the country further violence.

On the negative side, Aristide's shortcomings were described as many and serious: his dictatorial and oppressive style (including the use of armed gangs to intimidate his opponents) was cited as a chief cause of the insurgency against him; his failure to improve the economic lot of people he championed was seen as leading to his loss of popular support; a high level of personal and government corruption was also reported; as was his alleged involvement in drug trafficking. His departure from the country was portrayed as an outcome that was popular with the population and was presented as a positive step toward resolving Haiti's problems with democratic governance. Interestingly, his well-known anti-American views and his criticisms of U.S. policies toward Haiti or allegations of mental instability that has been raised against him in 1993 and 1994 were not mentioned.

The verbal image presented of President Aristide's armed opponents likewise contains a mix of positive and negative descriptors, in which the negative side predominates (see Appendix B). On the positive side, the rebels were portrayed as leading a movement that had popular support and that was gaining in strength. Rebels were seen as reasonable, in that they indicated that they would welcome international intervention and would delay an armed attack on Port-au-Prince in favour of a less violent alternative. Their victorious entrance to the capital was also described in positive language—e.g., "Haiti's new heroes" (ABC, 2004, Mar.1).

However, as with President Aristide, the negative characteristics of the rebels eclipsed the positive dimensions of their media portrayal. In particular, two themes stand out: the suspect pasts of their major leaders, Guy Philippe and Louis-Jodel Chamblain, and their use of violence (especially their killing of police) to achieve political ends. Chamblain's leadership of Army death squads during the period of the Cédras dictatorship was, far and away, the most commented upon aspect of the rebel leadership. And, while we did not code for intensity of positive or negative descriptors, arguably, this was the most emotionally powerful of all words and phrases that were used to describe the rebels.

References to Haiti as a country were almost totally negative, as the country received at best a token amount of positive and neutral/ambiguous descriptive language (see Appendix C). This degree of negativity, while not entirely unexpected given the level of on-going violence and Haiti's history, cannot possibly be without negative consequences for the prospects of future U.S. aid; this is especially the case when we take into account the negative impact of the visual dimension discussed in the analysis of Table 4.

Four aspects of Haiti stood out in negative commentary: its long-

standing state of poverty and seeming inability to escape this poverty; its chronic political instability and social violence (with the situation portrayed as becoming worse, to the point where Haiti finally ended up as a "failed state"); the likelihood that on-going instability and violence would cause large numbers of Haitians to flee the country for a better life in the United States; and the country's use as a transhipment point for South American drugs on their way to the United States. The negligible positive comments dealt with the possible benefits to the country stemming from President Aristide's departure.

Evaluations of the role of United States in the crisis are the most complex, nuanced, and difficult to evaluate with respect to their impact (see Appendix D). Specifically, the evaluation panel had difficulty agreeing on whether statements focused on U.S. reluctance to intervene militarily to quell the insurgency (thus protecting Aristide and his government), as well as those referring to the U.S. policy to repatriate Haitian refugees summarily without any hearing as to their claims, would have been seen positively or negatively by the U.S. population. Indeed, in view of the polarization of the U.S. electorate evident in the November 2004 election, it is probable that these policies would have been viewed quite differently by liberal and conservative viewers. Thus, while these descriptors clearly are not neutral, they do appear to be correctly categorized as ambiguous.

Among those descriptors classified as positive, the majority reflected views that the U.S. was both willing and trying to resolve the crisis. As well, statements from the administration that the U.S. had not kidnaped Aristide and sent him off to Africa against his will were seen to be convincing in defending against Aristide's charges.

Negative commentary on the United States clustered around three major topics: the failure of its policies in 1994 to ensure that enough was done to get Haiti on the right path to democratic stability; its complicity in the overthrow of Aristide in 2004;[8] and its failure to support Aristide as a lack of respect for constitutional government at a critical moment even if the United States wasn't directly involved in Aristide's overthrow. As is evident from a perusal of the descriptors in Appendix D, George W. Bush was extremely successful in distancing himself from the crisis—it was the policies of the United States, not its president, that came under media fire.

Discussion

The insurgency that ousted Jean-Bertrand Aristide from the Haitian presidency was treated as a significant event by U.S. television news, as it was covered on the ground from Haiti by all the major networks and, compared

with coverage of other crises, was reported in a respectable number of stories. Granted, television news networks were a bit late in getting to Haiti, but once there, the coverage they provided was on-going and informative. Their coverage was, however, very light on providing background to the crisis. In fact, one may have gained the impression that Haitian history began in 1990, with Aristide's election. And, as has been pointed out, with respect to negativity, coverage was characterized by what can only be described as "overkill" (see Gros, 1997).

Not surprisingly, coverage of the crisis tended to be event-focused; and since the insurgents were pressing the attack, they and the violence they perpetrated garnered the bulk of media attention. While of all the players involved, President Aristide was the most visible on U.S. television screens, he was not especially effective in getting his side of the story out. He appeared in only one in-depth TV interview, in which he ignored the question put to him regarding how he was going to deal with the "rebel" uprising, instead taking great pains to label the rebels "terrorists" (ABC, 2004, Feb.16). In so doing he basically wasted an opportunity to explain the insurgency in terms of anti-democratic forces from the past returning to Haiti to retake political control of the country, an argument that might have been an effective strategy in getting U.S. public opinion on his side. As is evident by the fact that the Haitian government was cited as a news source a total of only four times over the entire course of the crisis, it appears that there was no government-organized public relations campaign in place designed to get points of view favourable to President Aristide into the hands of the media. If true, this is certainly a significant failure.

On a comparative basis, television news coverage was not virulently anti-Aristide, but neither was it sympathetic to his plight. His democratic credentials gained in the 1990 election were commented on, as were the high expectations generated by his return at the hands of the Americans in 1994. These were then contrasted with his reputed authoritarian tendencies, his failure to deliver on promises of economic betterment, and consequent loss of popular support. These were the dimensions that dominated crisis coverage from the very outset. The frame of a democratic government under siege, which might have been received sympathetically by the American public, simply did not appear in television coverage until it was too late to do any good, i.e., until after Aristide had resigned the presidency and had left the country. Aristide's post-resignation claim to have been kidnaped by U.S. forces was portrayed as improbable, if not fanciful.

TV news coverage of the rebel forces was by no means naive or sympathetic, as the questionable backgrounds of Guy Philippe and especially

of Louis-Jodel Chamblain were addressed in many stories, although the career of neither man was ever the subject of in-depth treatment. Philippe, in particular, appeared to understand media, had movie star looks, could communicate in English, and knew what to say to appear reasonable, the one exception being his self-elevation (following the departure of Aristide) to the position of "Chief" of the non-existent Haitian Army (NBC, 2004, Mar. 2; Polgreen and Weiner, 2004, Mar. 3). With respect to coverage of the rebels, what was interesting, and although mentioned, never pursued, was the source of their funding. While not having heavy weapons or military transport, the rebels were extremely well-outfitted in what appeared to be new American-style camouflage uniforms and were armed with modern weapons. This was no "rag-tag" army recruited from peasants who had dug up weapons buried since the 1994 restoration of Aristide. It will be interesting so see where the money trail eventually leads (see Wilentz, 2004; Engler and Fenton, 2005).

U.S. policy toward the crisis was initially portrayed as one of supporting Aristide as the elected President of Haiti, while at the same time serving as a broker, trying to work out a compromise between Aristide and his domestic political opponents. While a U.S. military intervention was flatly ruled out from the onset of the crisis, there remained the possibility of a commitment of U.S. troops to put down the insurgency, hinged on achieving a political settlement. While the U.S. policy of non-intervention in the crisis was mentioned early on in a number of stories, it tended to be explained in terms of the U.S. having its "hands full" in Afghanistan and Iraq, rather than as an attempt to ignore Haiti or to force a regime change. Except for one sound bite from U.S. Senator Bill Nelson, who pointed out that as the violence in Haiti escalated, the American "hands off" policy might be interpreted as promoting regime change, i.e., letting the situation get so chaotic that Aristide would be forced to leave (ABC, 2004, Feb. 21), the implications that this non-intervention policy had for the survival of Haitian democracy were not addressed in any sustained way until after Aristide had departed.

It was France, not the United States, that was first reported pulling the plug on Aristide's international support (ABC, 2004, Feb. 25). Soon after, the U.S. began to hedge on its earlier position of support for the Haitian president, telling Aristide that he should consider his options "carefully" (NBC, 2004, Feb. 26), raising questions whether it was possible for him to continue to rule "effectively" (ABC, 2004, Feb. 26), and finally taking what was described as a "more aggressive stance" on Haiti's leadership (CBS, 2004, Feb. 28). From this point, things moved quickly; Aristide left the country for exile in Africa in the early hours of February 29th.

It was only after Aristide had left Haiti that U.S. policy really came under scrutiny and criticism in media reporting. This criticism focused not only on the consequences of its not having done enough for Haiti following the 1994 intervention and restoration of Aristide, but on the failure of the United States to have supported democracy in the hemisphere in the current crisis. President Bush maintained a very low profile during the crisis, not appearing on television news until after Aristide had left the country. Clearly, the American President wanted to distance himself and the United States from what was happening in Haiti and largely succeeded in doing the former, if not the latter.[9]

Overall, as indicated in the analyses of Tables 4 and 5, media coverage (both visual and verbal) painted an extraordinarily bleak picture of Haiti and its future prospects for democratic stability. Given Haiti's history (both past and recent), the thrust of portrayal is probably fundamentally accurate. This said, the extent of negative portrayals, combined with the virtual absence of positive portrayals, is no less than extraordinary. Certainly U.S. television news can be faulted for failing to attempt to place Haiti's poverty and political instability in any historical perspective. That the richest colony in the world in the late 18th century had become the poorest nation in the western hemisphere at the beginning of the 21st century cannot be explained solely in terms of the failures of the government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Surely the contributions of the color and class divide domestically and of lack of support internationally could at least have been mentioned as factors contributing to Haiti's problems. This important historical context was simply lacking in media reports. With seemingly no redeeming qualities and faced with a litany of problems, television news portrayals of Haiti were decidedly unhelpful to those who will have to make the case for renewed American aid to Haiti in the sure to be difficult years to come.

There was no implication in television reporting of the crisis that the political forces opposed to Aristide (identified with figures such as Andy Apaid and Charles Baker of the Group of 184) controlled the insurgency, which was led in the main by Guy Philippe and others such as Louis-Jodel Chamblain and Butteur Amoit. The latter were associated with the former Haitian Army (FAD'H), the paramilitary organization (FRAPH) dating back to the time of the Cédras military dictatorship, and, more recently, pro-Aristide street gangs (Nairn, 1994, Oct. 24; Coughlin, 1999, Mar. 1; Polgreen and Weiner, 2004, Mar. 1). Television news reporting made it clear that these connections were not likely to be a positive factor in Haiti's political future and appear to have been on the mark.

Conclusion

The parallels between nineteenth and early twentieth-century methods of regime change in Haiti (those that provoked the U.S. intervention in 1915) and the scenario that unfolded to unseat Aristide in February 2004 are both clear and chilling (Hrab 2004, Mar. 27).[10] It is certainly unclear to this writer whether U.S. policy-makers realized how fragile the situation in Haiti really was and that the overthrow of Aristide would result in the collapse of the Haitian state, setting in train over the next two years a record of misery and chaos under UN supervision (for the Mandate of "MINUSTAH" see United Nations, 2004). A study carried out by the University of Miami's Center for the Study of Human Rights in November of 2004 portrayed a grim picture of the status of Haiti:

> After ten months under an interim government backed by the United States, Canada, and France and buttressed by a United Nations force, Haiti's people churn inside a hurricane of violence. Gunfire crackles, once bustling streets are abandoned to cadavers, and whole neighborhoods are cut off from the outside world. Nightmarish fear now accompanies Haiti's poorest in their struggles to survive in destitution. Gangs, police, irregular soldiers, and even UN peacekeepers bring fear. There has been no investment in dialogue to end the violence. (Griffin 2004, p. i; see also Haiti Information Project. 2004, Dec. 14)

In these circumstances, there were some who called for "a good, old fashioned trusteeship" for Haiti, claiming what is needed is "a multilateral force with a 25-year mandate to rebuild the country year by year. Everythings's been destroyed. It's a failed state, a failed nation" (Riordan Roett as quoted in Bachelet, 2004).

Given the high media visibility and negative reaction accorded the mid-February return to Haiti of Guy Philippe and Louis-Jodel Chamblain, one would have thought that the United States might have considered that the alternatives to Aristide could well prove to be more problematic than the incumbent. Such a judgment would have suggested a policy of pressuring Aristide's political opposition to accept the significant power-sharing package agreed to by Aristide, albeit one that included retaining the incumbent elected president. In addition, it would have avoided many of the hardships suffered by ordinary Haitians during and following the insurgency where violence was allowed to rule, unchecked by any authority (Associated Press, 2004, Mar. 26). In any event, it is questionable whether Aristide's rule was "so bad" as to justify the direful consequences for Haiti

that have followed his overthrow. Let us bear in mind that Aristide's second term would have been coming to an end, and new elections would have been held at the end of 2005, two months earlier than they were eventually held in February 2006. It is difficult to imagine that circumstances in Haiti between 2004 and 2006 could have been worse under Aristide than they were under the interim Latortue government.

The February 2006 elections, although not without their problems, were an obvious step forward for Haiti. Following these elections, President René Préval's task unfortunately will involve far more than merely starting over from where things had been in the country two years previously. He will be forced to deal with a Haiti that is far more politically fractured and economically devastated than was the case in 2004 and, as the reaction to the 2006 election count demonstrates, one where intimidation and violence simmers just below the surface. He will also have to deal with the continuing political ambitions of Jean-Bertrand Aristide (gone, but not forgotten), who may return to Haiti from exile in South Africa (Balint-Kurti, 2004; Villelabeitia and Helps, 2004; Buddan, 2006). Clearly there are times when "the devil you know is better than the one you don't," and, for Haiti, February 2004 increasingly looks like it may have been one of those times.

Notes

[1] One has to be careful about pronouncements regarding the end of political careers as they turn out to be premature; consider, for example, Argentina's Juan Peron and the Dominican Republic's Joaquin Balaguer.

[2] Coding for the study was done by the author. On the basis of a sample of 15% of the news stories, intercoder reliability for material in Tables 1, 2, and 4 was established at 91% and for material in Table 3 at 84% (Holsti, 1969). With respect to visuals reported in Table 4, there was no one piece of video that "defined" the crisis. Rather, what was important was the cumulative effect of an audience seeing the same scenes appear on an on-going basis throughout coverage of the crisis.

The full range of evaluative language studied in Table 5 was sent to a panel of five scholars in the areas of political science and communications studies. Panelists were asked to judge whether a particular word or phrase would likely be interpreted by an American audience as either "positive" or "negative" toward the object of reference. Four out of five panelists (80%) had to agree on a positive or negative evaluation in order for a descriptor to be counted in Table 5. All descriptors, as coded by the panel, including those judged "neutral" or "ambiguous" are shown in the Appendices.

[3] There is conflicting evidence regarding the sincerity of U.S. efforts to secure a compromise. While Secretary of State Colin Powell believed the U.S. was honestly trying to broker an agreement between Aristide and his political

opponents, *New York Times* correspondents Walt Bogdanish and Jenny Nordberg report that former U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, Brian Curran, charged that the International Republican Institute, a non-profit pro-democracy group that received U.S. government funding, counseled "the opposition to stand firm and not work with Mr. Aristide, as a way to cripple his government and drive him from power" (2006, Jan. 29, p. I1).

[4] A "news segment" is defined as a part of a total news story given focus by one reporter. In cases where the full news story is read by the anchor, one news segment is counted. When a story is introduced by the anchor and then is passed on to a reporter for detailed coverage, the number of news segments equals the number of reporters used in the story; in this case, the anchor's introduction is not counted.

[5] Because expert commentators tended to be used in clusters in the same story, this figure seriously understates their use. In total, 20 experts appeared on camera as sources of coverage of the crisis.

[6] In spite of its obvious applicability as a justification for a U.S. intervention in 1994, President Clinton chose to soft-pedal the refugee issue in favour of demonizing Haiti's military rulers. The restoration of President Aristide was presented by television news to the American people as a combination of rescuing the Haitian people from tyranny and restoring democracy (see Soderlund, 2003, pp. 163-164).

[7] During the period of repression leading up to the 1994 restoration of Aristide, "body spotting" became somewhat of a cottage industry in Haiti, with "fixers" charging $50.00 to $100.00 to "lead photographers and camera crews to sometimes still-warm bodies" (see Bragg, 1994, Aug. 19, p. A8).

[8] Ira Kursban, a lawyer representing Aristide's interests in the United States, leveled the clearest condemnation of the United States' role in the overthrow of Aristide, describing the ouster as "an operation by the United States intelligence community; that it was funded, directed, operated by the United States intelligence community, literally to put a gun to Aristide's head" (NBC, 2004, Feb. 29). Democratic Congressman Charles Rangel also charged the Bush Administration with using force to remove the Haitian President from the country (CBS, 2004, Mar.1). Ives Engler and Andrew Fenton claim there was an international conspiracy, entered into by France, the United States, and Canada, to withhold support from Aristide in order to effect a "regime change" in Haiti and that it began with the "Ottawa Initiative on Haiti" held on January 31-February 1, 2003, which they describe as "a dry run at the trusteeship that was to come" (2005, p. 42). Moreover, they report that representatives of the U.S. government-funded International Republican Institute (IRI) and that Paul Arcelin, a Haitian-born professor at the Université du Québec â Montréal and self-described "intellectual author" and "political leader" of the insurrection, met with Guy Philippe in Santo Domingo in December 2003 (Engler and Fenton, 2005, p. 27; pp. 44-45; pp. 61-62). Exactly what transpired at this meeting, however, is not reported. Amy Wilentz charges that negotiations with "Aristide and his party, [were] being used to foment and mask what was essentially a coup against democracy by the island's elite, in concert with right-wing elements of

the [U.S] Republican Party" (Wilentz, 2004). In light of the evidence unearthed by Bogdanish and Nordberg that " there was a change in policy that was perhaps not well perceived by some people at the embassy... [that]... [W]e wanted to change, to give the Haitians, an opportunity to choose a democratic leader" (State Department official, Otto Reich, as quoted in Bogdanish and Nordberg, 2006, Jan. 29, p. I10), allegations of U.S. complicity in the overthrow of the Haitian President have taken on greater credibility.

[9] In that the American President could appear nightly on television news if he so chose, such lack of visibility on the part of Mr. Bush was clearly not accidental. A similar presidential absence was evident on the part of Bill Clinton in television news coverage of the 1994 Zapatista Rebellion in Mexico. In fact, Mr. Clinton bested Bush's lack of visibility by never appearing on video, never being cited as a source, and never even being mentioned by name in coverage of the Zapatista rebellion (Soderlund, 2003).

[10] In the context of a post-Aristide Haiti, Neil Hrab draws attention to Arthur Millspaugh's prescient 1931 critique of the first U.S. occupation of Haiti (1915-1934). Millspaugh was critical of the occupation for its preoccupation with building infrastructure and its neglect of " intangible" factors such as developing a "capacity for self-government." Hrab ends his article by quoting Millspaugh's prediction of an "embarrassing legacy" for the American occupation, namely, " recurring cycles of revolution, ruin and intervention" (Hrab, 2004, Mar. 27, pp. RB1; RB6).

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Appendix A: Jean-Bertrand Aristide Descriptors

Words and Phrases Coded Positive

—Haiti's first and only democratically elected President/a priest who was democratically elected President in 1990

—remains a hero to many

—"My country has a crisis and we want to solve that crisis"

—is still firmly in control

—open to a U.S.-backed proposal to end the two-week old uprising/agreed to a peace plan/agreed to a U.S.-backed peace plan/ "We agree to have a new government with a new Prime Minister"

—accepted calls for political reform and disarmament

—wants peace in the country

—"We are all prepared to die for President Aristide"/"I will stay with him"/ "Aristide forever"/"We're ready to die for Aristide because of liberty"

—ready to die to defend his country/vowed that he would rather die than resign/ defiant/will not give in to insurgents demanding his resignation

—"We will continue to face terrorism, to fight in a legal way, those who come here as terrorists to destroy the country"

—pleaded for a stop to the violence

—"I love Aristide"

—will not negotiate with the leaders of the bloody uprising/insisted on no negotiations with terrorists

—"I accept resignation to avoid a bloodbath"/to avoid a bloodbath, he fled the country/resigned under international pressure to avoid a civil war

—"I accept resignation for a better life for everyone"

—the best hope for a desperately poor nation

Words and Phrases Coded Negative

—accused of corruption and also of human rights violations/widely seen as a corrupt leader who abandoned his people/has become a corrupt dictator, ignoring the people/ "Over time he became corrupted, forced out many friends from his government, and tried to consolidate power under himself"/oppressive, corrupt government/widespread corruption in President Aristide's government/ police are corrupt

—democracy as practiced by Aristide has done little to improve life/after ten years, he has not been able to improve the standard of living/has done little to end the corruption, poverty, and violence endemic to Haiti

—his style became increasingly dictatorial/had become a real obstacle to democracy

—will not permit a demonstration by students against his government

—"Aristide has betrayed us all"

—"If Mr. Aristide is so popular, if Mr. Aristide is in such a strong position, why does he have to intimidate people?"

—Aristide loyalists stoned demonstrators/pro-Aristide gangs managed to disrupt a demonstration/using street gangs to stifle dissent

—"Like it or not, Aristide must go"/"Down with Aristide"

—"We tried to get Aristide out of power because he killed some people, then, right now, he don't want to go"

—"He is not serious, he lie to the people"/has broken his promises too many times

—his political party swept flawed legislative elections/never lived up to his promise for honest parliamentary elections

—"The nature of governance in this country over the past two years has contributed to the deterioration of the situation"/"Much of the violence we now see is created by gangs that were once aligned with the Aristide government"/blamed for Haiti's many miseries/"He has to bear a large burden, if not the major burden for what has happened"/involved in violence that brought on the crisis/blamed for violence/"I blame President Aristide"

—"Democratically elected, but he did not democratically govern or govern well"

—people have lost faith in Aristide

—[his government] continued losing its grip on the countryside

—may not be the devil his opponents make him out to be, but he is a giant headache for the U.S.

—he has failed them [the people of Haiti]

—unlikely to accept an international peace plan to end the revolt

—there is total dissatisfaction with Haiti's president

—willing to trade a bloody revolt for his political survival

—his chimêre looted a police station, stealing the weapons/armed gangs loyal to Aristide now rule the streets/his loyalist gangs roam at will/loyalists terrorize the population/Aristide's thugs

—blamed for widespread drug trafficking/has not arrested prosecuted a single major drug trafficker in the past year/the presidential security unit and palace guard were actively involved in drug trafficking

—France wants Aristide to step down/French government thinks he should resign/ his international support has crumbled

—on the edge of a cliff/hangs by a thread/desperately hanging on to power

—clear he is losing control of the capital

—his government is in a death spiral/on a political death-watch/is finished and should leave

—may only have hours left before he must leave

—believed holed up in the Presidential palace

—Haiti has a President, but no one seems in charge

—he has no power, half the country is controlled by the rebels, so what's left?

—control of his country and support from Washington are nearly gone

—the cause of the rebellion is gone

—the President's departure seen as a hope for a new beginning/Aristide's departure provides hope to give Haiti a new start

—Haitians are celebrating because Aristide is gone/Haitians poured into the streets of the capital, celebrating the end of the Aristide era/ "Hallelujah for Haiti"

—there are calls for Aristide to return to face trials for crimes against his country

Words and Phrases Coded Neutral or Ambiguous

—his resignation demanded/wanted

—President

—embattled President

—former President/departed President

—Mr.

—chased from power in 1991

—demanded rebels end their one week-old rebellion

—once a symbol of democracy/once regarded at a hero of democracy

—restored to office by an American invasion/returned to power by the U.S. ten years ago

—acknowledged that his country could be at the brink of a civil war

—said he would not resign/would not step down/ignoring calls to resign

—appealed for international help/appealed for foreign help

—will not relinquish power until his term ends in 2006/won't leave until his term expires in 2006

—warned that thousands of people would die if the international community didn't intervene

—warned of thousands of deaths and a new wave of Haitian boat people heading for Florida

—may be willing to step down

—"If Aristide doesn't finish his term, we will cut off people's heads"

—negotiating for exile

—if he leaves, who will replace him?

—pressured to flee by Washington and other in the international community/under pressure from the U.S., he resigned and fled in to exile

—faced a growing rebel movement to overthrow his government

—first democratically elected President, forced out, having lost control of his people

—may have some hopes of returning

—in Africa, looking for a country that will take him on a long-term basis

—it was his decision to leave

—asked Washington's help to go into exile/asked the U.S. to guarantee his safety

—fled early this morning

—feels it was a coup, that he was kidnaped by U.S. authorities/claims he was kidnaped, forced out by the U.S.

—forced out of Haiti at gun-point/forced to resign and put on a plane at gun-point

—waits to see if he will be granted political asylum in South Africa

—may have been a thug, but he was an elected one

Appendix B: Rebel Descriptors

Words and Phrases Coded Positive

—popular uprising

—gaining strength/expanding their power/gaining territory every day

—would welcome U.S. intervention/will welcome an international force

—"We're working for the people"

—well-organized, with clear lines of command and control

—agreed to postpone an attack on Port-au-Prince for a day or two/can wait before springing an attack

—"We are in the capital to give security to people"/going to the capital to give security to the people

—Haiti's new heroes

—rode triumphantly into the capital/moved into the capital with a hero's welcome/ feeding off popularity that resembled rock stardom

—entered the capital peacefully

—"I will dedicate myself to the defense of my country"

—"I am ready to die for my country"

—promised to disarm his troops

Words and Phrases Coded Negative

—street gangs

—terrorists/"They are terrorists"/"Terrorists who are willing to destroy our democratic practice"

—much feared leader of Army death squads/leader of Haiti's notorious death squads that once terrorized the country/reputed death squad leader of the 1980s/former head of death squads/former head of death squads believed responsible for killing thousands in the 1980s

—former Police Chief who fled four years ago after being accused of trying to orchestrate a coup

—hated para-military troops

—killed a Police Chief/killed police and others who support the government

—armed thugs who have turned against Aristide

—ransacked police stations/burned a police station

—run by drug traffickers and the former head of an Army death squad/know drug traffickers

—armed gangs, joined by ex-military and death squad leaders

—groups of marauding rebels

—could begin a grim march to the capital

—no better than Aristide

—"They arrested me because they thought I was an Aristide supporter and then they beat me"

—rampaging

—rebel gangs, many with their own corrupt pasts

—killers

—violent/men with violent pasts

—thugs

—have no intention of putting down their arms/still heavily armed

—involved in much of the violence that drew the U.S. into Haiti ten years ago

—cocaine gang thugs

—without any legal authority declared himself the commander of the Army/ declared himself the Army's Commandant General/appointed himself in charge of Haiti's military/"I am the Chief"

—answerable to no one

Words and Phrases Coded Neutral or Ambiguous

—rebels/rebel groups/armed rebels/rebel forces/rebel soldiers/para-military rebels

—anti-government forces/anti-Aristide forces

—opponents of the government/opposed to President Aristide/groups seeking to overthrow the President/fighting to get rid of the President

—determined to oust the President Aristide/fighting to overthrow the government

—militias, once loyal to Aristide, have turned against the President/armed rebels, many were loyal to the President

—not prepared to wait

—all agree, Aristide should go/united only by their determination to get rid of the President/loosely allied

—insurgents

—old enemies of Jean-Bertrand Aristide

—declared Gonaïve an independent country/installed their own government

—putting more pressure on the government

—number as few as 1000/number between 250 and 1000

—90% are former members of the Haitian Army

—massing on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince

—soon will be on President Aristide's doorstep

—giddy

—not clear whether rebels will be welcome in the capital

—on the streets of Port-au-Prince

—not interested in becoming President/have no role in Haiti's future

—determined to play a role in the country's future

—intoxicated by their new status as heroes

—told in no uncertain terms to disarm his rebel forces, and within hours he did just that

Appendix C: Haiti Descriptors

<u>Words and Phrases Coded Positive</u>

—"Hallelujah for Haiti"

—the country's troubles left with President Aristide/Aristide's departure provides hope to give Haiti a new start

<u>Words and Phrases Coded Negative</u>

—always afflicted by desperate poverty/western hemisphere's poorest country/ desperately poor country/still the poorest country in the hemisphere/the average Haitian gets by on less than a dollar a day/poorest country in the western hemisphere and tonight the most dangerous/80% of the population lives below the poverty line/desperately poor Caribbean nation/people wade through garbage for a shred of hope/desperate poverty has worsened/small impoverished and politically troubled nation

—desperation is numbingly familiar

—faces violence and armed rebellion/violence is threatening to tear the country apart/spreading chaos and violence/bloodier days are still ahead/when it comes to violence, Haiti is in a league of its own/could become a bloodbath/armed thugs attacking at will/government troops torch houses/ most dangerous nation in the hemisphere/violent death is now a way of life/most bloody, violent, and chaotic place in the hemisphere/has a murderous history/has a long history of rebellion

—a growing number of Haitian see their future in rebellion

—the ultimate victim could be the American attempt to install democracy in Haiti/biggest victim in Haiti is democracy

—raised the spectre of humanitarian disaster

—plagued by instability/political chaos/deepening tumble into political crisis/on the brink of political collapse/widespread turmoil/anarchy is taking hold/slide into anarchy is almost complete/ "This is chaos"/has slipped into anarchy/rampant instability a great concern to the UN Security Council

—could be on the brink of civil war/real fear the country is headed for a civil war/fears of a civil war/ country descends into civil war/teeters on civil war

—moving toward greater confrontation

—"There is no democracy in Haiti at all"

—closer to revolution than to a peaceful solution

—it's more than dictatorship, it's anarchy

—"You could well have thousands of Haitians trying to get out of Haiti"/"Unless the country develops, people are going to feel the only way they can have a decent life is to leave"/ "There is no future for people here in Haiti"/chaos would lead to a new wave of Haitians leaving the country/ "We have more Haitians living in Haiti who want to go to Florida/Haitians want to get out of the country/ "I want to get the Hell out of here"

—had thirty-two governments overthrown by coup, left wondering if they're about to see number thirty-three

—hundreds of foreigners leaving the country/foreign aid workers are leaving/ frightened foreigners getting out while they can

—a humanitarian catastrophe in the making

—more focused on retribution than on redemption

—rampage of looting/widespread looting/scattered looting/looting warehouses

—never seems to get out of the hole

—a strategic threat to the U.S./powder key on the southern flank of the U.S.

—a narco-state/well organized launching pad for narcotics trafficking into the U.S./fear is that Haiti is becoming a narco-state, a country without a functioning government, ruled by drug traffickers

—a failed state

—it's a bloody mess

—Hell on earth

—a thugs' paradise

—Haitians have never had a sense of security

—no one in control/who is really in charge?/a country without anyone in charge/left with no clear political direction

—no rule of law/all semblance of law and order has given way to wreck and ruin/lawless country

—a costly example

—has come full-circle/is back where it started a decade ago/is back where it started

—a body is just more street debris

Words and Phrases Coded Neutral or Ambiguous

—hope they have avoided a bloodbath

—in the middle of a coup

—needs help quickly

Appendix D: U.S. Government/George W. Bush Descriptors

<u>Words and Phrases Coded Positive</u>

—"We will accept no outcome that in any way illegally attempts to remove the elected President of Haiti"

—has backed Aristide

—trying to convince both sides to accept a compromise that would head off a coup/ pushed for compromise/tried to broker a peace plan/has chosen diplomacy

—supported a power sharing plan rejected by the political opposition

—the U.S. will help/ the U.S. is prepared to help

—supported Aristide as long as they could

—helped Aristide get out of the country after he agreed to leave/Powell made 50 calls on his behalf

—"Allegations that we somehow kidnaped the former President are baseless and absurd"/ the allegations are "absolute nonsense"/says Aristide left voluntarily, accompanied by his own security men/vehemently denied Aristide was taken against his will

<u>Words and Phrases Coded Negative</u>

—"I think the U.S. should intervene more directly and more forcefully"/criticized for its hands off approach/believe the U.S. should play a much bigger role in stopping the violence

—Bush barely mentioned the departed Haitian President/a sign of how little Bush cares for Aristide

—criticized for leaving Haiti too soon [in 1994]/ "We didn't stay long enough and we're seeing the results of that"/ "You can't fix a society as broken as Haiti in two years"/ "We left them too soon before, we left them in chaos"/left too soon/went in with a one year plan for a ten year problem

—criticized for denying Aristide needed resources

—"We're not putting forward a plan that calls for Aristide to step down"

—accused of engaging in a political war against Aristide

—images of refugees unnerve the Bush administration

—U.S. repatriation of Haitians is shameful

—"an operation by the U.S. intelligence community, that was funded, directed, operated by the U.S. intelligence community, literally to put a gun to Aristide's head"/accused of toppling President Aristide from power/a decision was made that Aristide's time was up/the U.S. government, not the rebels, blamed for Aristide's ouster/ "The so-called resignation was dictated to him over the phone by the U.S. Embassy"/ "It seems as if we have a policy of regime change: let the situation get so bad, so chaotic, that Aristide is driven from office"

—turn of events is shameful, showed no respect for constitutional government/

President Bush not universally applauded for his handling of the Haitian crisis/left the White House open to the charge that it failed democracy and left yet another country with no clear political direction

—"Sending Haitians directly to Haiti, that decision is in disagreement with international legal procedure"

—accused of abducting the President/ "The President of Haiti was kidnaped by U.S. Marines"

—U.S. support for democracy is not rock solid/ "We participated in his ouster, that is clear"

—satisfied administration hardliners who wanted Aristide gone

Words and Phrases Coded Neutral or Ambiguous

—watching Haiti with growing concern/diplomats worry that there will be another mass exodus of refugees to the U.S./biggest worry is a repeat of a mass exodus of refugees/watching the military and humanitarian situation closely

—"We clearly hoped that the intervention [in 1994] and the efforts we made following the intervention would have turned Haiti around and it hasn't"

—the Bush administration says it will not get involved/the U.S. would not send troops/ruled out intervention/ "Given our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, it's not realistic to think that we would want to take on any other military interventions at this time"/reluctant to get involved in Haiti/trying to avoid military conflict in Haiti/with its hands full in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration has been reluctant to get involved/there is little enthusiasm right now for sending in military or police forces/no appetite in Washington for intervention again/desperately wants to avoid sending in U.S. troops/rejects sending U.S. troops to Haiti/not getting involved/refuses to intervene

—the Coast Guard intercepted 148 Haitians/has a policy to deal with refugees— intercept them at sea and send them right back to Haiti/ "We have a plan in place to stop any boats and return them to their country of origin"/Haitian refugees trying to flee the country would be turned back/will turn back any Haitian refugee who tries to reach American shores/ sent back hundreds of refugees/sent 531 Haitians back home/intercepted almost 900 Haitians/made it clear that any Haitian trying to come here would be sent back/Coast Guard will turn back anyone trying to make his way to the U.S.

—would support the deployment of a multi-national force to Haiti, but only when a political settlement is reached

—would not rescue President Aristide

—has used its power and influence before/will it send troops this time?

—is open to Aristide's departure as a way out of the crisis/would not object if he did step down/openly hinting Aristide should go

—let it be known that President Aristide should resign/White House is openly hinting Aristide should go/pressured Aristide to leave

—urged all Americans living in Haiti to leave/ urged Americans to get out of Haiti/

ordered all non-essential State Department employees out the country/ordered all non-essential personnel to leave/ordered non-essential Embassy staff out of the country

—planning a full-scale evacuation of Americans, if necessary

—Black Caucus asked Bush to send American troops to guard a humanitarian corridor

—has no choice but to support Aristide since he was democratically elected

—choosing its words about Aristide carefully/asks Aristide to consider his position carefully

—"We're not putting forward a plan that calls for Aristide to step down"

—questioned whether Aristide can continue to serve effectively/questions Aristide's ability to govern the country

—"The longer this crisis goes, the more likely it is that there will have to be a U.S. intervention"

—charges that the political crisis is largely the making of Aristide/blaming Aristide for the violence in his country

—taking a more aggressive stand on Haiti's leadership and it's clear time is running out

—calling on Aristide to strongly consider stepping aside for the good of his country

—is sending in the Marines/orders U.S. Marines to Haiti/ordered the deployment of Marines

—denies it forced Aristide into exile, although it applauds his departure