



OBSERVATORY ON PUBLIC POLICIES AND ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

MINUSTAH:

A FINANCIAL OVERVIEW OF PEACEKEEPING IN HAITI

After former President Aristide's departure in 2004, Haiti was confronted with a major security crisis. The country seemed to be stigmatized by armed violence from groups which defied the authority of the Transitional Government and by others trying to perform law and order duties without authorization. Based on this situation and on various geopolitical interests, the United Nations Security Council voted in favor of its resolution 1542 (2004) creating a peacekeeping operation: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). MINUSTAH succeeded several other U.N. interventions since 1990 and has now been in the country for nine years.

Traditionally associated with the monitoring of a ceasefire agreement between two warring factions, peacekeeping operations' characteristics under United Nations command has evolved over the years. Presently there are a variety of U.N. interventions in the world with a variety of tasks aimed at contributing to the end of armed conflicts or to decreasing their risk. In many cases, these operations made it possible to mitigate tensions and avoid escalating violence. In contrast, they have also revealed their limits.


Currently, Haiti hosts about 10% of the uniformed personnel (soldiers and police officers) deployed globally for U.N. peacekeeping operations (Details page 3)¹.



MINUSTAH funding represents an important position in regards to funds the international community mobilizes for Haiti aside from sums disbursed for humanitarian assistance and long-term development (Figure 1). In official statistics, peacekeeping expenditures are generally excluded from official development assistance. However, OECD emphasizes that "some closely-defined developmentally relevant activities within peacekeeping operations are included".¹

In this monitoring bulletin, the Observatory aims at shedding some light on MINUSTAH's funding mechanisms.

Figure 1: Estimates of selected funding sources for Haiti from January 2010 to June 2012 (in USD millions)



Source: U-N Special Envoy, "Can more aid stay in Haiti and other fragile settings?", November of 2012; translated and adapted by the Observatory

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I - FUNDING OF MINUSTAH BUDGET BY U.N. MEMBER STATES

-Each Member State is obliged to contribute to the United Nations in accordance with its economic conditions -

The United Nations (U.N.) has a regular budget and a peacekeeping budget whose expenditure is divided between member States. Like any peacekeeping operation (PKO), MINUSTAH has a specific budget that the U.N. General Assembly, based on the Secretary General's and an Advisory Committee's reports, approves and controls each year. The budgetary cycle of peacekeeping operations goes from July 1st to June 30th (12 months). In this respect, the sum of 576 619 000 US\$ has been approved for MINUSTAH operations for the 2013-2014 fiscal year. Resources are classified into three main categories:

Military and police personnel costs	263 million US\$
Civilian personnel costs	135 million US\$
Operational requirements	179 million US\$
<i>Source: UN GA Document A/C.5/67/19</i>	



With this amount, MINUSTAH currently represents the fifth largest budget of 14 peacekeeping operations throughout the world. The total funding of worldwide peacekeeping operations amounts to 7.5 billion US\$ in 2013-2014.¹

In order to divide the costs, the United Nations adopted an assessed quota scale which establishes percentages that the

different Member States have to contribute. It is supposed to reflect the contributive and economic capacity of each country. The percentages established for the peacekeeping budget differ slightly from the percentages of the regular budget. The five permanent members of the Security Council, who are more influential in decisions concerning the creation of a peacekeeping operation and the determination of its mandate, have to pay a higher rate. On the other hand, economically least developed countries contribute at a lower rate. The proportions of assessed Member States' contributions are the same throughout all peacekeeping missions. For instance, since 2013, the United States has to pay 28.4% of all peacekeeping budgets while France contributes 7.2% and the United Kingdom 6.7% (Figure 3) ¹.

As a U.N. Member State, Haiti is therefore obliged to pay a mandatory contribution to all budgets of the organization. In this sense, the country contributes 0.003% of the U.N.'s regular budget and 0.0003% of all the peacekeeping budgets including that of MINUSTAH.¹

It is worth noting that Member States are sometimes hesitant and withhold their contribution to the peacekeeping budget. The United Nations indicate that, in June 2013, 1.24 billion US\$ of debts for all operations in the world were outstanding.



II - VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

-MINUSTAH's military and police component is composed of personnel from different States-



The United Nations (U.N.) has neither an army, nor a permanent police force. When a peacekeeping mission is mandated by the Security Council, the U.N. requests contributions of troops and police officers from its member states. In accordance with the needs of the different missions and with each country's internal policy, these States propose to provide military and police contingents in order to serve the mission. Likewise, the military equipment belongs to Member States who make them available to the United Nations.

In return for sending their personnel, for its logistic support and its supplies, the Member States receive a flatrate compensation. Said compensations thus apply to all States independently of actually incurred expenses. For example, the monthly compensation for a soldier amounts to 1028 US\$ per month and was recently increased by 6.75%. An additional 303 US\$ per month is paid for certain specialized soldiers. This compensation is directly paid to contributing countries that are responsible for paying their personnel. The exact conditions of these payments are determined in a Memorandum of Understanding signed by the U.N. and each concerned country. About 46% of MINUSTAH's budget in 2013-2014 is intended for these reimbursements¹.

On the other hand, the civil personnel and certain police officers sent outside of contingents receive their remuneration directly from the UN.


It is worth noting that incurred expenses by contributing countries, namely for training, wages and equipment costs for the personnel they send, vary largely among the different States. For example, in 2010, the United States increased their budget by 45 million US\$ in order to support the U.N. police force in Haiti with 35 additional agents and equipment, while South Korea contributed 240 additional soldiers, predominantly engineers, for a cost of approximately 25 million US\$¹.

While this compensation system is less expensive than maintaining a permanent force belonging to the United Nations, it has often been criticized as a less effective method because of the troops' disparate preparation, the inadequacy of certain equipment and lengthy deployment delays.

At the end of June 2013, MINUSTAH totaled 8,793 soldiers and police officers: 910 individual police officers, 1,676 contingent police officers and 6,207 soldiers. Of these agents 1,407 came from Brazil, making it the mission's largest military contributor. As figure 4 shows it, the main contributing countries are considered to be "developing countries", particularly countries from Latin America¹.

Since the beginning of MINUSTAH's mandate, the number of military and police contingents in Haiti authorized by the Security Council's resolutions has varied significantly. With 6,700 soldiers and 1,622 police officers in 2004, the force reached its peak in 2010 with 8,940 soldiers and 4,391 police officers authorized following the earthquake. Today, with 6,270 soldiers and 2,601 police officers authorized in October of 2012, the uniformed personnel was slightly reduced and Brazil, Japan and South Korea in particular, withdrew some troops. MINUSTAH's 2013-2016 consolidation plan provides for a reduction of the uniformed personnel of about 30% compared to that of 2012 if a certain number of conditions, related to security and Haitian authorities' administration capacities, are met. A timetable for the gradual, well-ordered and final withdrawal of the troops, which would make it possible to bring together various concerned sectors at the negotiation table, has not been established yet.¹

Figure 4: Top uniformed personnel contributors to MINUSTAH at the end of June 2013



Source: Development of CERFAS' Observatory according to UN peacekeeping data

III - MINUSTAH'S INTERVENTIONS AND IMPACT IN HAITI

- Commitment in numerous areas casts doubt on the exact mandate-

MINUSTAH's mandate, which does not intervene in a conflict between two clearly established warring factions, is rather broad and anticipates supporting the Government in the establishment of a safe and stable environment, particularly by strengthening the national police force, promoting human rights as well as supporting a constitutional and political process towards good governance and the rule of law (S/RES/1542)¹. Although its mission has been adapted according to the context - and despite a certain improvement of the security situation since 2004 - contingents deployed in Haiti have hardly decreased and the mission is intervening in an increasingly diverse range of areas. Today its military contingents, police forces and civil agents are working not only to support the police department and judicial reform, but also to create labor-intensive temporary jobs, develop municipalities, support the legislative agenda and customs authorities, promote human rights and gender equality, etc.

Following the earthquake, support to infrastructure construction through military engineering contingents and small projects aiming at enhancing the mission's image (Quick Impact Projects = QIPs) have also multiplied. Quick Impact Projects are short-term and small scale projects essentially aiming at reinforcing trust in the mission, in its mandate and in the peace process, but they are not supposed to offer humanitarian support or long-term development. They allow, for example, the installation of solar street lamps or rehabilitation of certain buildings and can be carried out by different stakeholders (NGOs, UN, Government or MINUSTAH itself). Between July 2004 and January 2012, 1201 QIPs totaling 24.62 million US\$ were implemented¹. The importance of these projects in order to "enhance the trust of the Haitian population towards MINUSTAH" was emphasized in the Security Council's resolution 2070 in 2012.

The costs of some of these activities are sometimes covered by additional voluntary contributions coming from certain donors, as is currently the case of Norway.

Although social and economic development is certainly a crucial factor for enhancing a secure and stable environment, it is worth wondering if extremely complex structural problems like those in Haiti can be solved by dispersed projects which are the by-product of a military force.

Apart from the doubt as to the real impact of the mission's activities, its reputation was strongly tarnished because of sexual assault cases perpetrated by certain soldiers and following the scandal around the cholera epidemic. Since the beginning of the spread of the disease in October 2010, several studies have established a link between MINUSTAH's Nepalese contingent and the origin of the epidemic. A of July 2013, cholera had infected 667,122 people and had caused 8,190 registered deaths.¹ Although a panel of independent experts' report admitted that the Artibonite river has been contaminated by a Southeast Asian strain of the virus, the UN adopted the position that the origin of the epidemic is not important for the fight against it and is only committing to prevention and treatment activities.



In this regard, in February and July 2013, the UN refused to respond to a compensation claim filed by cholera victims, even though the standing claims commission, provided for in paragraph 55 of the agreement between the UN and the Haitian Government concerning the status of MINUSTAH, does not exist in order to deal with the dispute.

More than two years after the epidemic's outbreak, a national cholera eradication plan estimates that 2.2 billion US\$ will be needed to fight the epidemic until 2022. In December 2012, the UN announced a 23.5 million US\$-contribution, additional funding will depend especially on their availability to raise other funds from official development assistance. In view of the reduction of international commitments during the last year, it seems uncertain that the required funds will be available in time¹.

IV - ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES

-The level of countries' commitment in favor of PKO depends largely on their respective priorities-

Five decades of peacekeeping operations in the world have cost member states considerable amounts. These funds, whether mandatory payments to the United Nations (UN) or voluntary contributions, are derived from the national budgets of their respective Governments, who are accountable to their citizens. The support of another nation within the framework of external cooperation must therefore correspond to the countries' respective interests and priorities. Although it is not possible to draw up an exhaustive list of the underlying reasons which push states to commit themselves to peace and international security, it is worth analyzing some challenges which are related to the deployment of the U.N. force in Haiti.

Mandatory contributions to the budget

The obligation to contribute to the United Nations budget stems from the will of sovereign States to become a member of this international organization. Whereas all member States have to contribute to the total of peacekeeping operations (PKO) in the world, the largest contributions come from a small number of countries (Figure 3). During recent years, major contributors, in particular from Europe, questioned the amounts they had to pay. Yet in other cases, States estimate that they have benefitted from cost sharing and the fact that PKOs are generally less expensive than the deployment of national armed forces. In this sense, the *United States Government Accountability Office* estimated in 2006 that a similar US intervention in Haiti would cost twice as much as MINUSTAH's intervention (GAO, 2006). This would be notably due to higher standards in wages and facilities which would be necessary for US military deployment.

These countries are generally hesitant to deploy their own personnel in peacekeeping missions, whether it is for financial reasons or other political considerations.

Deploying personnel

Development countries contribute the majority of military and police personnel. The contribution of personnel and equipment can constitute a considerable economic interest whether it is because of compensation rates or job opportunities for their citizens.

Nevertheless, particularly for emerging economies these compensations become less and less important and the political and operational reasons which justify deploying troops cannot be cast aside. Within MINUSTAH, we most specifically notice an important commitment from Latin American countries which provide about 70% of the troops. This participation of countries from the region can be explained in part by these countries' objective to jointly ensure regional stability, but also by their will to assert themselves on the international stage.

Brazil, a rapidly rising economic force, is in a position to take advantage of closer relations with the International Community and has expressed its will to obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council. Many States also understand that the possibility of committing their troops to a PKO is a recognition on the international stage and of their operational capacity. It is worth remembering how much the Haitian authorities welcomed the U.N.'s invitation to send police officers to the MINURCAT in Africa in 2009, even though this deployment ultimately was not carried out.

In general, all operations do not represent the same interest for the different member states and budgetary negotiations are often difficult. Therefore, in certain cases the U.N. has difficulties in finding sufficient soldiers for the respective missions. In other cases, personnel contributing countries complain of being deprived of expensive equipment which would be necessary for an effective intervention.



Police station in front of «camp Canaan», a shanty town created after the 12.01.2010 earthquake

V - PERSPECTIVES

More than nine years after MINUSTAH's creation, troops continue to be deployed in Haiti and the mission costs significant sums to U.N. Member States. This shows that, for various reasons, a certain number of states in the international community still attach great importance to foreign soldiers "stabilizing" the country.

In the meantime, MINUSTAH'S departure is at the heart of discussions within the Haitian population's different strata. On the one hand, diverse protest movements are organized in order to demand its departure and claim compensation for the cholera victims. Two resolutions adopted by the Haitian Senate, respectively in September 2011 and May 2013, demand progressive and well-ordered withdrawal within a year. On the other hand, certain representatives of the Administration and from international institutions argue that an immediate departure would comprise too many risks given the weakness of government institutions.

In light of what we have been observing, it is worth wondering if there is a true will to succeed in peace and stability building in Haiti. Although different plans and strategies developed since 2004 have emphasized the importance of strengthening government institutions and particularly an in-depth justice and public security system reform, results still do not seem tangible. As a recent OECD study specifies, actions targeted at strengthening the government have not been integrated into coherent policies and the funda-

Senate of the Republic's 28.05.13 resolution:

Article 1 – The Haitian Government must produce the formal request and establish a timeline for the withdrawal of U.N. forces in Haiti accompanied by a gradual decrease of troops and the subsequent transfer of military competences to national forces. [...]

Article 4 – The Haitian Government must develop a judicial and legal framework and program in the 2013-2014 budget ways and means to substantially reinforce manpower in Haiti's National Police in order to ensure the entire country's security. [...]

mental causes of Haiti's instability, such as food insecurity, disaster risk, youth unemployment and social exclusion persist.

Since 2006, two reform and development plans for Haiti's National police force have been adopted by the Haitian Government and international stakeholders. The evaluations of the 2006-2011 plan show that the objectives regarding the increase in police manpower could not be reached and that it has been seriously underfunded. Of the expected 700 million US\$, only 175 million US\$, hence 25%, have been mobilized (Figure 5). It is still unclear whether the implementation procedures of the 2012-2016 plan are going to change in order to produce more tangible results.

Figure 5 : Estimates in regards to reinforcing Haiti's National Police Department (Source : 2012-2016 Development Plan)

	In 2006	Results expected from the 2006-2011 plan	Assessment after implementation of the 2006 - 2011 plan	Results expected from the 2012-2016 plan
Number of police officers	7 157	14 000	10 106 (of which 989 prison officers)	A minimum of 15 000
Budget		700 million US\$	175 million \$ US	1.35 billion US\$



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This bulletin is available in French, Creole, English and Spanish

¹ For more information and a bibliography: www.cerfashaiti.org/observatoire.html

****We welcome your questions, suggestions and comments****